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Abstract 
In the stop-signal paradigm, fast responses are harder to inhibit than slow responses, so subjects 
must balance speed on the go task with successful stopping in the stop task. In theory, subjects 
achieve this balance by adjusting response thresholds for the go task, making proactive 
adjustments in response to instructions that indicate that relevant stop signals are likely to occur. 
We report five experiments that tested this theoretical claim, presenting cues that indicated 
whether or not stop signals were relevant for the next few trials. Subjects made proactive 
response-strategy adjustments in each experiment: diffusion-model fits showed that response 
threshold increased when subjects expected stop signals to occur, slowing go responses and 
increasing accuracy. Furthermore, our results show that subjects can make proactive response-
strategy adjustments on a trial-by-trial basis, suggesting a flexible cognitive system that can 
proactively adjust itself in changing environments.  
 
KEYWORDS: response strategies, proactive control adjustments, stop-signal paradigm, reaction 
time models
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Cognitive control processes are required to achieve a balance between competing goals in ever-
changing environments (Baddeley, 1996; Logan, 1985; Miller & Cohen, 2001). These control 
processes allow people to adjust response strategies in cognitively demanding situations. 
Response-strategy adjustments are typically investigated by manipulating task instructions (e.g., 
Howell & Kreidler, 1963; Rinkenauer, Osman, Ulrich, Muller-Gethmann & Mattes, 2004), by 
presenting distracting information (e.g., Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979, 1982) or by analyzing trials 
following an error or response conflict (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001; 
Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1992; Rabbitt, 1966, 1968). In the present study, we investigated how 
people adjust response strategies in a multi-tasking situation know as the stop-signal paradigm 
(Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Vince, 1948). The stop-signal paradigm 
involves a trade-off between two tasks with opposing requirements: a go task, which requires 
subjects to respond as quickly as possible when a stimulus is presented, and a stop task, which 
requires subjects to stop the response when a stop signal is presented. Success on the go task 
(fast responding) implies failure on the stop task (not stopping a response); success on the stop 
task (stopping a response) implies failure on the go task (slow responding) In five experiments, 
we examined whether subjects make proactive response-strategy adjustments when a pre-cue 
informs them about the occurrence of stop signals on the next few trials, trading speed on the go 
task for success in the stop task.  
 In the stop-signal paradigm, subjects perform a go task and on a random selection of the 
trials (stop-signal trials), a stop signal is presented, instructing them to withhold their go 
responses. Several studies suggest that people change response strategies after stop-signal trials 
(e.g., Emeric et al., 2007; Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Schachar et al., 2004; Verbruggen & Logan, 
in press; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, 2008). Rieger and Gauggel (1999) 
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found that go reaction times (RTs) for no-stop-signal trials were prolonged when a stop signal 
was presented on the previous trial. They suggested that subjects change their response strategy 
after successful and unsuccessful inhibition to increase the probability of stopping on the next 
trial. Other researchers found that response strategies changed only after unsuccessful stopping 
(Schachar et al., 2004; Verbruggen & Logan, in press; Verbruggen et al., 2008). Schachar et al. 
and Verbruggen et al. suggested that subjects interpret responses on stop-signal trials as errors 
(see also e.g., Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; van Boxtel, van der Molen & Jennings, 2005) and this 
leads to response-strategy adjustments, which are reminiscent of the common finding that 
subjects shift response thresholds after making errors in choice-response tasks (Rabbitt, 1966, 
1968), trading speed for accuracy. These studies show that subjects make reactive response-
strategy adjustments after stop-signal presentation (Rieger & Gauggel, 1999) or after 
unsuccessful inhibition (Schachar et al., 2004; Verbruggen & Logan, in press; Verbruggen et al., 
2008). In the present study, we investigated whether subjects also make proactive response-
strategy adjustments when a pre-cue informs them that stop signals are likely on the next few 
trials.  
In stop-signal experiments, subjects are told not to wait for the stop signal (e.g., Logan, 
Cowan & Davis, 1984; Logan, Schachar & Tannock, 1997; Ridderinkhof, Band & Logan, 1999; 
Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Verbruggen, Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, 2004). Despite these 
instructions, RTs for no-stop-signal trials increase when stop-signal probability increases (e.g., 
Logan, 1981; Logan & Burkell, 1986) and Verbruggen and colleagues found longer RTs in 
blocks in which stop signals were expected than in control blocks in which no stop signals were 
expected (Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Notebaert & Vandierendonck, 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2004; 
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Verbruggen, Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, 2006; see also Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Stuphorn & 
Schall, 2006).  
These effects of the introduction of stop-signal trials are interpreted as evidence that 
subjects proactively change response strategies at the beginning of a stop-signal block, trading 
speed in the go task for success in the stop task (e.g., Logan & Burkell, 1986). However, the 
longer RTs in stop-signal blocks could be due to increased cognitive demands: First, two task 
goals (going and stopping) are involved in stop-signal blocks (Logan & Cowan, 1984; 
Verbruggen, Schneider & Logan, in press) whereas only one task goal (going) is involved in no-
stop-signal blocks. Maintaining different task goals is thought to require cognitive control 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001; Miyake et al., 2000), so increased cognitive demands could increase RT. 
Second, subjects have to monitor for stop signals while performing the go task in stop-signal 
blocks. Monitoring for auditory signals can slow responses to visual stimuli (e.g., Spence & 
Driver, 1997; Vandierendonck, De Vooght & Van der Goten, 1998b). Thus, dual-task 
requirements could also contribute to the RT differences between stop-signal blocks and no-stop-
signal blocks. 
 We report five experiments that examined how go performance is influenced by the 
presentation of a pre-cue informing subjects about the occurrence of stop signals on the next few 
trials. We distinguish between two hypotheses, the proactive-adjustment hypothesis and the dual-
task requirement hypothesis. Alternatives to these hypotheses are discussed in the General 
Discussion.  
The proactive-adjustment hypothesis assumes that subjects balance stopping and going 
by adjusting the response threshold in the go task. Performance in the stop-signal paradigm 
depends on the relative finishing times of a go process triggered by the go stimulus that races 
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against a stop process triggered by the stop signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984). If the stop process 
finishes before the go process, then subjects inhibit their response (signal-inhibit trials). If the go 
process finishes before the stop process, then subjects fail to inhibit their response (signal-
respond trials). Increasing the response threshold will increase the finishing time of the go 
process and decrease the probability of responding given a stop signal [p(respond|signal) = the 
probability of failing to inhibit]. This trade-off is depicted in Figure 1. P(respond|signal), 
represented by the area under the curve to the left of the dashed line, depends primarily on three 
factors: RT, the delay between the target and the stop signal (stop-signal delay, or SSD), and the 
latency of the stop process (stop-signal reaction time, or SSRT). When SSD increases but SSRT 
and the RT distribution do not change, p(respond|signal) increases (see Figure 1B vs. Figure 1A). 
When SSRT increases but SSD and the RT distribution do not change, p(respond|signal) also 
increases (see Figure 1C vs. Figure 1A). However, when the RT distribution is shifted to the 
right but SSD and SSRT do not change, p(respond|signal) decreases (see Figure 1D vs. Figure 
1A). We assume that this third case—slowing RT without changing SSD or SSRT—is the result 
of proactive response-strategy adjustments that trade speed in the go task for success in the stop 
task.  
The dual-task-requirements hypothesis assumes that the increased RTs are due to 
increased cognitive demands in stop-signal blocks: stop-signal blocks involve two task goals 
(going and stopping) and subjects must attend to visual and auditory stimuli whereas no-stop-
signal blocks involve only one task goal (going) and subjects must attend only to visual stimuli. 
The increased working-memory load and the requirement to divide attention between audition 
and vision could slow RTs in stop-signal blocks. Thus, the major difference between the two 
hypotheses is that the proactive-adjustment hypothesis assumes that increased RTs are caused by 
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a deliberate, proactive response-strategy shift whereas the dual-task-requirements hypothesis 
assumes that increased RTs are caused by higher task demands in the stop-signal blocks.  
The two hypotheses predict longer RTs for no-stop-signal trials when subjects expect a 
stop signal than when they do not. However, the two hypotheses make different predictions 
about accuracy. Models of RT assume that RT and accuracy are the results of a decision process 
in which information for the possible responses accumulates in response counters, and a response 
is chosen when the information in one of the counters exceeds a threshold (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978; 
Ratcliff, Van Zandt & McKoon, 1999; Usher & McClelland, 2001). The two hypotheses predict 
that the presence of stop signals will influence different parameters of the decision process (see 
Figure 2). The proactive-adjustment hypothesis predicts that the response threshold will be 
higher in stop-signal blocks than in no-stop-signal blocks. Increasing the threshold increases the 
amount of information required to choose a response, and that increases both RT and accuracy 
(Ratcliff, 1978).The dual-task-requirements hypothesis predicts that the presence of stop signals 
will increase the latency of non-decisional processes, such as stimulus encoding and motor 
execution, and lower the growth rate of information accumulation. Longer non-decision time and 
lower growth rate will both increase overall RT, but will influence accuracy differently: accuracy 
should be the same when non-decision time is influenced whereas it should decrease when 
growth rate is influenced.   
In the present study, we considered RT and accuracy together to distinguish between the 
proactive-adjustment hypothesis and the dual-task-requirement hypothesis. We also fitted the 
diffusion model to the data (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff et al., 1999) so that we could attribute 
observed changes in speed and accuracy to specific underlying processes—threshold, drift rate, 
or decision time, alone or in combination (see Wagenmakers, van der Maas & Grasman, 2007).  
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We fitted Fast-dm (Voss & Voss, 2007), which allows fast and accurate estimations of the 
diffusion-model parameters even when the number of trials for every condition and subject is 
relatively low.  
The Present Study 
We conducted five experiments to determine whether subjects make proactive response-
strategy adjustments in the stop-signal paradigm. In each experiment, subjects performed a 
choice-reaction task and a stop signal was presented on a random selection of the trials. In 
addition, we presented context cues, making stop signals relevant or irrelevant for 4-8 trials 
within a block. In Experiment 1, we used two context cues: ‘none’, which indicated that none of 
the stop signals were relevant so they could be ignored, and ‘all’, which indicated that all stop 
signals were relevant and that subjects had to stop their response when a tone was presented.  
In Experiment 1, we asked whether subjects use the pre-cues to make response-strategy 
adjustments prior to the presentation of the go stimuli (they do). In Experiment 2, we asked 
whether dividing attention between the auditory and visual modality influenced performance, 
using a dual-task design in which subjects had to complete the first response and then execute a 
second response when a relevant tone occurred. We used two cues: ‘single,’ which indicated that 
all tones could be ignored, and ‘dual,’ which indicated that subjects had to press the space bar as 
quickly as possible when a tone occurred. Differences between the single and dual contexts 
assess the effects of dual-task requirements.  
In Experiments 3-5, we focused only on proactive response-strategy adjustments and 
examined how specific they are. In Experiment 3, we manipulated the number of consecutive 
trials on which a cue remained on the screen to determine whether subjects proactively change 
response strategies when the cue changed after every trial. In Experiment 4, we prolonged the 
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duration of the stop process by requiring subjects to inhibit selectively (e.g., Bedard et al., 2002; 
Riegler, 1986). We presented two new cues: ‘low,’ which indicated that subjects were to stop 
their response only when a low tone was presented, and ‘high,’ which indicated that subjects 
were to stop their response only when a high tone was presented. To assess the effect on 
response-strategy adjustments, we compared performance with none and all cues. In Experiment 
5, we used cues that indicated the probability that a stop signal would be presented on the next 
trial (0% stop signals, 30% stop signals or 70% stop signals) to determine whether stop-signal 
probability affects proactive response-strategy adjustments. 
 In all experiments, we compared the proactive-adjustment hypothesis to the dual-task 
requirements hypothesis. The proactive-adjustment hypothesis predicted higher response 
thresholds in stop-signal contexts, resulting in longer RTs and higher accuracy on no-stop-signal 
trials in stop-signal contexts (i.e., all and low/high contexts, or the 30% and 70% contexts in 
Experiment 5) than in the none contexts. The dual-task-requirement hypothesis predicted longer 
non-decision time, lower growth rate, or both, in the stop-signal contexts, resulting in longer RTs 
and equivalent (when only non-decision processes change) or worse accuracy (when growth rate 
changes) on in stop-signal contexts than in the none context. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, subjects discriminated between ‘Z’ and ‘/’ in the go task and stopped 
their response when they heard a relevant stop signal. The relevance of stop signals was 
indicated by context cues: ‘none’ indicated that none of the stop signals were relevant and could 
be ignored, whereas ‘all’ indicated that all stop signals were relevant so subjects had to stop their 
responses whenever a tone occurred.  
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Strayer and Kramer (1994) found that subjects could not change response criteria 
proactively in response to pre-cues (see also Brown & Steyvers, 2005) but subjects were able to 
set response criteria at the beginning of each block and make reactive adjustments after each trial. 
These findings suggest that subjects may make proactive response-strategy adjustments only at 
the beginning of a stop-signal block (Logan, 1981; Logan & Burkell, 1986; Verbruggen et al., 
2004, 2006) and then make reactive adjustments after stop-signal trials (e.g., Rieger & Gauggel, 
1999; Verbruggen et al., 2008). Therefore, in Experiment 1, we asked whether subjects could use 
pre-cues to adjust response criteria proactively.  
We tested the proactive response-strategy adjustment hypotheses and the dual-task-
requirement hypothesis by comparing no-stop-signal performance in the none and all contexts. If 
subjects increase their response threshold to decrease p(respond|signal), then RTs should be 
longer and accuracy should be higher in the all context than in the none context. If differences 
between the all and none context are due to dual-task requirements only, then RTs should be 
longer but accuracy should be similar or lower in the all context than in the none context, 
depending on whether non-decision or growth-rate parameters (or both) are influenced by the 
increased cognitive demands.  
Method 
 Subjects. Eighteen students from Vanderbilt University participated for course credit. All 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and all were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment.  
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was run on a Pentium 4 PC running Tscope 
(Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen & Vandierendonck, 2006). The stimuli were presented on a 
21-inch cathode ray tube monitor. The go task was to respond to ‘Z’ (6 x 9 mm) or ‘/’ (6 x 9 mm) 
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by pressing the corresponding key of a QWERTY keyboard with the left and right index finger, 
respectively. The stop-signal context was indicated by the words ‘none’ (25 x 6 mm) or ‘all’ (20 
x 8 mm). The stimuli and context cues were centrally presented in a white lower case Courier 
font on a black background. Context cues appeared 20 mm above the stimulus (see Figure 3). On 
signal trials, a loud and clear auditory signal (80dB, 75 ms) was presented through closed 
headphones (Sennheiser eH150), using stop-signal presentation functions of STOP-IT 
(Verbruggen, Logan & Stevens, in press). One half of the signals were high tones (750 Hz), the 
other half were low tones (250 Hz).  
 Procedure. Instructions were explained orally by the experimenter. Instructions 
emphasized both accuracy and speed. Trials were divided in runs of 4 or 8 trials in the same 
context. Run length was randomized with the restriction that there were no context repetitions 
(e.g., 2 x 8 none context trials) and that runs of 4 trials and runs of 8 trials occurred with equal 
probability. Half of the trials were none context trials and half were all context trials. 
 All trial runs started with the presentation of the context cue (see Figure 3). After 1,000 
ms, the first stimulus was presented. The stimulus was removed after 100 ms and required a 
response within 1,250 ms. The inter-stimulus interval within the same context was 2,000 ms, 
regardless of RT. The context cue remained on the screen during the whole run and was removed 
1,250 ms after the presentation of the last stimulus of the run. The interval between the removal 
of the previous context cue and the presentation of the new cue was 750 ms.  
On 1/3 of the trials, a stop signal was presented. Half of the stop signals were high tones, 
the other half were low tones. In the none context, all stop signals were irrelevant and subjects 
were instructed to respond on all trials. In the all context, all stop signals were relevant and 
subjects were instructed to stop their response whenever a low or high tone was presented. 
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Relevant and irrelevant stop signals were presented after a variable SSD. In the all context, the 
SSD was initially set at 150 ms and continuously adjusted according to a tracking procedure to 
obtain a probability of stopping of .50 (Logan et al., 1997). Each time a subject responded to the 
stimulus on a stop-signal trial, SSD decreased by 25 ms. When subjects inhibited successfully, 
SSD increased by 25 ms. Subjects were informed about this tracking procedure and they were 
told not to wait for a stop signal to occur. They were also told that it would be easy to stop on 
some trials and difficult or impossible to stop on other trials because SSD varied substantially. In 
the none context, the SSD was the same as the current SSD for the all context trials.  
The experiment started with a practice block of 24 trials without stop signals. This no-
stop-signal block was followed by a practice block of 48 trials in which the context cues and 
both relevant and irrelevant stop signals were presented. During the practice block, subjects 
received immediate feedback at the end of each trial. On no-stop-signal trials, ‘wrong’ appeared 
when they made an error and ‘try to respond faster’ appeared when they did not respond in time. 
On irrelevant stop-signal trials, ‘this was an irrelevant signal’ was presented when they 
erroneously stopped their response. On relevant stop-signal trials, ‘this was a relevant signal’ 
was presented when subjects responded. The feedback remained in the center of the screen for 
750 ms. The experimental phase of the consisted of 6 blocks of 96 trials. At the end of each 
block, we presented the number of no-stop-signal errors, the mean RT, the number of incorrectly 
stopped responses in the none context, and the probability of stopping in the all context. Subjects 
had to pause for 10 seconds.  
Results and Discussion 
Because go performance is influenced by stop-signal presentation or erroneous go 
responses on the previous trials (e.g., Rabbitt, 1966; Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Verbruggen et al., 
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2008), we excluded trials that followed a stop-signal trial or an incorrect no-stop-signal trial 
(including no-stop-signal trials on which no response was executed) in analyses1 of go 
performance.  
Mean RTs were calculated after removal of go errors. Outlying RTs (RTs longer than 2.5 
SDs above the mean for each trial type; 2.9% of the trials) were discarded from data analysis. 
Proactive response-strategy adjustments could result in a higher percentage of omitted responses 
as well as higher accuracy, so we distinguished between omission rate and accuracy: omission 
rate is the ratio of the number of omitted responses to the total number of no-stop-signal trials 
[i.e., omission rate = 100 * omitted / (correct + incorrect + omitted)] and accuracy is the ratio of 
the number of correct responses to the number of correct and incorrect responses [i.e., accuracy = 
100 * correct / (correct + incorrect)]. 
Signal analyses. P(respond|signal), SSD and SSRT are presented in Table 1. We 
compared go performance on stop-signal trials with go performance on no-stop-signal trials in 
the none and all context by means of separate repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs). RT, accuracy and omission rate are presented in Table 2. Summary tables for the 
ANOVAs are presented in Table 3.  
In the none context, RT was longer for stop-signal trials (425 ms) than for no-stop-signal 
trials (408 ms). Omission rate was higher for stop-signal trials (2.4%) than for no-stop-signal 
trials (0.9%). These findings suggest that subjects could not completely ignore irrelevant stop 
signals. Accuracy was comparable for stop-signal trials and no-stop-signal trials. In the all 
context, we found that RTs were shorter for signal-respond trials (444 ms) than for no-stop-
signal trials (501 ms), which is consistent with the horse-race model of stop-signal performance 
(Logan & Cowan, 1984). Accuracy was comparable for signal-respond and no-stop-signal trials.  
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Context analyses. We analyzed RTs, accuracy data, and omission rates for no-stop-signal 
trials by means of repeated measures ANOVAs with context as within-subjects factor. Summary 
tables for the ANOVAs are presented in Table 4. Observed RTs and accuracy scores are depicted 
Figure 4A; standard deviations appear presented in Table 2. We also examined the effect of trial 
position following the context cues (see Figure 3); these position analyses appear in Appendix A. 
Consistent with the proactive adjustment hypothesis, we found significantly longer RTs 
(all = 501 ms; none = 408 ms) and higher accuracy (all = 98.7%; none’ = 97.2%) in the all 
context than in the none context, suggesting that the response threshold was increased in the all 
context. The percentage of omitted responses was similar in the all and none contexts.  
Diffusion-model fits. We used Fast-dm2 to estimate the parameters of the diffusion model 
for each subject. Boundary separation (a; i.e., the distance between the decision thresholds; 
larger values of a result in fewer errors but longer RTs), growth rate (v; larger values of v result 
in fewer errors and shorter RTs) and non-decision time (t0; larger values of t0 result in longer 
RTs) were allowed to take different values in the none context and the all context. We estimated 
the parameters for each subject and each stop-signal context separately and examined the effect 
of stop-signal context on the parameters in separate repeated-measures ANOVAs with context as 
a within-subjects factor. The mean values for each parameter are presented in Table 5, the 
estimated decision time and non-decision time are depicted in Figure 4B, and the analyses appear 
in Table 6.  
Consistent with the proactive-adjustment hypothesis, we found a significant increase in 
boundary separation in the all context (all = 1.30, none = 1.12), demonstrating that subjects 
increased response thresholds when they expected relevant stop signals to occur. (The model fits 
assumed symmetrical boundaries, so response threshold = boundary separation / 2.) We also 
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found a significant increase in non-decision time (all = 327 ms, none = 295 ms) and a decrease in 
growth rate (all = 3.76 units/sec, none = 4.45 units/sec), which is consistent with the dual-task 
requirement hypothesis.  
Summary. Consistent with the proactive-adjustment hypothesis, the behavioral results and 
the estimated parameters suggest that subjects increased response threshold when they expected 
stop signals to occur on the next few trials. The position analyses presented in Appendix A 
suggest that subjects made these adjustments at the beginning of the all contexts. However, the 
differences in non-decision time and growth rate suggest that dual-task requirements also 
contributed to the difference between the all and none contexts. We tested this hypothesis in 
Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested the effects of dual-task requirements directly by having 
subjects perform a second go task on relevant signal trials. The primary go task (the go1 task) 
was the same as in Experiment 1. However, subjects no longer had to stop the response when a 
relevant signal was presented. Instead, they had to execute a second response. We used two cues: 
‘single,’ which indicated that all tones could be ignored, and ‘dual,’ which indicated that subjects 
had to press the space bar as quickly as possible on signal trials (i.e., perform a go2 task) after 
they executed the go1 response. The dual context required subjects to maintain two task goals 
(the go1 goal and the go2 goal) and monitor for dual-task signals. Differences in go1 RT and 
accuracy between the single and dual contexts would support the dual-task requirements 
hypothesis. A pattern of differences similar to the pattern observed in Experiment 1 would 
suggest that dual-task requirements may also limit performance in the stop-signal paradigm.  
Method 
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  Subjects. Eighteen students from Vanderbilt University participated for course credit. All 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and all were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment.  
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure. These were the same as in Experiment 1 except for the 
following: Half of the trials were single context trials and the other half were dual context trials; 
the contexts were indicated by the cues ‘single’ and ‘dual,’ respectively. In the single context, 
subjects could ignore all tones. In the dual context, subjects had to press the space bar with the 
index fingers of both hands when a tone was presented. Subjects were instructed to execute the 
‘Z’ or ‘/’ response (the go1 responses) first and grouping of responses was discouraged. We 
simulated a tracking procedure to produce a range of SSDs similar to the ones observed in 
Experiment 1: when go1 RT on a dual-task trial was longer than SSD + 263 ms (the mean SSRT 
in Experiment 1), SSD decreased by 25 ms (viz., signal-respond); when go1 RT on a dual-task 
trial was shorter than SSD + 263 ms, SSD increased by 25 ms (viz., signal-inhibit).  
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, we excluded trials that followed a dual-task trial or an incorrect no-
signal trial in analyses of go1 performance. Mean go1 RTs were calculated after removal of go1 
errors and outlying RTs (2.1% of the trials).   
Signal analyses. Go1 RT, accuracy and omission rate are presented in Table 2. Summary 
tables for the ANOVAs are presented in Table 3. In the single context, subjects pressed the space 
bar on 6.3% (SE = 1.3%) of the signal trials, which is significantly different from 0%, t(17) = 5.1, 
p < .001. No subjects pressed the space bar on no-signal trials. Go1 RT and accuracy were 
comparable for no-signal and signal trials. Omission rate for no-signal trials was 0%; omission 
rate for signal trials (0.2%) was not significantly different from 0%, t(1,17) = 1.18, p > .18. In the 
 17 
dual context, subjects pressed the space bar on 97.1% (SE = 0.6%) of the signal trials. Mean 
SOA was 149 ms (SE = 13 ms) and go2 RT was 558 ms (SE = 11 ms). Go1 RT, accuracy and 
omission rate were comparable for no-signal and signal trials, suggesting that subjects did not 
group responses. No subjects pressed the space bar on no-signal trials.  
Context analyses. Go1 RTs and accuracy were analyzed by means of repeated measures 
ANOVAs with context as a within-subject factor. Summary tables for the ANOVAs are 
presented in Table 4. Observed go1 RTs and accuracy scores are depicted Figure 4A; standard 
deviations appear in Table 2.  
To test the effects of dual-task requirements, we compared performance in the dual and 
single contexts. Go1 RTs for no-signal trials were significantly longer in the dual context (399 
ms) than in the single context (390 ms). There was no effect of context on accuracy. These 
findings suggest that subjects did not make proactive response-strategy adjustments when they 
expected dual-task signals to occur. The small RT difference between the single and dual 
contexts is probably due to the dual-task requirements. Importantly, the RT difference was 
smaller than in Experiment 1, suggesting that the RT difference in Experiment 1 was mostly due 
to proactive response-strategy adjustments. Omission rate was 0% in the single context and 0.2% 
in the dual context. The latter difference was significantly greater than 0%,t(1,17) = 2.2, p < .05. 
Because subjects did not make proactive response-strategy adjustments, we did not analyze the 
data as a function of position. 
 Diffusion-model fits. As in Experiment 1, we used Fast-dm to estimate the diffusion 
parameters for each subject. The mean values for each parameter are presented in Table 5 and 
the estimated decision time and non-decision time are depicted in Figure 4B; the analyses appear 
in Table 6. In contrast to Experiment 1, we did not find a significant difference in boundary 
 18 
separation (dual = .93, single = 0.93). Consistent with the dual-task requirements hypothesis, we 
found that non-decision time was significantly longer in dual-task (309 ms) than in single-task 
(295 ms) conditions. Paradoxically, growth rate was significantly higher in the dual-task 
condition (5.03 units/sec) than in the single-task condition (4.59 units/sec). 
 These fits suggest that diffusion-model parameters are influenced differently by 
introducing stop signals (Experiment 1) and dual-task signals (Experiment 2). To further test the 
difference between Experiment 1 and 2, we re-analyzed diffusion-model parameters by means of 
a mixed ANOVA with context (none/single vs. all/dual) as a within-subjects factor and 
experiment (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2) as a between-subjects factor. We will focus on the 
interaction between the two factors only.  
 For boundary separation, we found a significant interaction between context and 
experiment (see Table 6), suggesting that subjects increased the response threshold in the all 
context but not in the dual context. (Note that boundary separation was higher overall in 
Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2). The interaction between context and experiment was also 
significant for growth rate: drift rate was lower in the all context than in the none context 
whereas it was higher in the dual context than in the single context. This finding suggests that the 
growth-rate difference in Experiment 1 was not due to dual-task requirements. The non-decision 
time difference was larger in Experiment 1 (32 ms) than in Experiment 2 (14 ms), but the 
interaction did not reach significance. We will discuss the growth-rate and non-decision time 
differences further in the General Discussion.  
Summary. The behavioral results and the diffusion-model fits of Experiment 2 suggest 
that subjects did not increase the response threshold when they expected dual-task signals to 
occur on the next few trials. This finding further supports the hypothesis that response-threshold 
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adjustments in Experiment 1 were specifically due to the introduction of stop signals: stop 
performance benefited from slow go1 RTs whereas go2 performance benefited from fast go2 
RTs. However, we did find RT differences between the single and dual context, suggesting that 
dual-task requirements also influenced performance. This finding was further supported by the 
significant differences in non-decision time in the diffusion-model fits. Thus, the results of 
Experiment 2 suggest that the RT differences between the none context and the all context in 
Experiment 1 were due to both proactive response-strategy adjustments and dual-task 
requirements.  
Experiment 3 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that subjects made proactive response-strategy 
adjustments when they expected relevant stop signals to occur. The position analyses presented 
in Appendix A suggest that subjects make these adjustments at the beginning of the all context. 
These findings are inconsistent with the results of Strayer and Kramer (1994) and suggest that 
subjects can adjust response criteria proactively in response to pre-cues in the stop-signal 
paradigm. One explanation for the discrepancy between our findings and those of Strayer and 
Kramer (1994) is that we used longer runs of trials, which may have encouraged subjects to 
make proactive adjustments. We tested this hypothesis in Experiment 3 by manipulating run 
length between blocks of trials. There were three run-length conditions: run length 1, in which, 
the cue changed on every trial, run length 2, in which the cue changed every two trials, and run 
length 4, in which the cue changed every four trials. The go task and the stop-signal contexts 
were the same as in Experiment 1. If subjects make proactive response-strategy adjustments only 
when the context remains the same for several trials, then there should be no difference between 
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the all and none contexts for run length 1, and possibly, a smaller difference for run length 2 than 
for run length 4.  
Subjects. Eighteen students from Vanderbilt University participated for course credit. All 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and all were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment.  
 Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. These were the same as in Experiment 1 except for 
the following: There were three run-length conditions: run length 1 (context changes on every 
trial), run length 2 (context changes every two trials) and run length 4 (context changes every 
four trials). The order of the conditions was counterbalanced. Every run-length condition 
consisted of a practice phase with stop signals (24 trials) and an experimental phase, which 
consisted of three blocks of 96 trials.  
Results and Discussion.  
Exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. Mean RT for included trials was 
calculated after exclusions of outliers ( 2.1%).  
Signal analyses. P(respond|signal), mean SSD and mean SSRT are presented in Table 1. 
As can be seen, run length did not affect stop-signal performance (all ps > .19). RT, accuracy and 
omission rate are presented in Table 2. In the initial analyses, the main effect of signal did not 
interact with run length. Therefore, we collapsed across the different run lengths for the 
comparison of no-stop-signal and stop-signal trials. The analyses of the main effect of signal are 
presented in Table 3.  
In the none context, RT was longer for stop-signal trials (479 ms) than for no-stop-signal 
trials (452 ms). Omission rate was higher for stop-signal trials (2.5%) than for no-stop-signal 
trials (1.0%). These findings are consistent with the findings of Experiment 1 and suggest that 
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subjects could not completely ignore irrelevant stop signals. Accuracy was comparable for stop-
signal and no-stop-signal trials. In the all context, signal-respond RTs (504 ms) were shorter than 
no-stop-signal RTs (565 ms) as predicted by the race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984); accuracy 
was comparable for signal and no-stop-signal  trials.  
Context analyses. To determine whether run length influenced proactive response-
strategy adjustments, we analyzed no-stop-signal performance by means of 2 (context: none or 
all) x 3 (run length: 1, 2, or 4) repeated measures ANOVAs. Summary tables for the ANOVAs 
are presented in Table 4. Observed RTs and accuracy scores are depicted in Figure 5A; standard 
deviations appear in Table 2. We again analyzed the data as a function of position in the run of 
trials; these position analyses appear in Appendix B.  
Overall, we found significantly longer RTs (all = 565 ms, none = 452 ms) and higher 
accuracy (all = 97.7%, none = 96.6%) in the all context than in the none context. These findings 
suggest that subjects increased the response threshold in the all context, trading speed in the go 
task for success in the stop task. Omission rate was also higher in the all context (2.3%) than in 
the none context (1.0%). We did not find a main effect of run length nor an interaction between 
context and run length, suggesting that subjects made similar proactive response-strategy 
adjustments in the three run lengths.  
 Diffusion-model fits. Diffusion parameters were estimated for each subject and each run 
length. Effects of context on boundary separation, growth rate and non-decision time were 
analyzed by means of separate repeated measures ANOVAs with context and run length as 
within-subjects factors. The mean values for each parameter appear in Table 5; the estimated 
decision time and non-decision time are depicted in Figure 5B; and analyses appear in Table 6.  
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Replicating the results of Experiment 1, we found significantly greater boundary 
separation in the all context (1.22) than in the none context (1.14). This effect was not influenced 
by run length (see Table 6), suggesting that subjects made the same proactive response-strategy 
adjustments whether a stop signal could occur on the next trial (run length 1) or next few trials 
(run length 2 and run length 4). Stop-signal context increased non-decision time but not growth 
rate. Run length did not influence these two parameters.  
Summary. Consistent with Experiment 1, we found longer RTs and higher accuracy in the 
all context than in the none context, and these differences were not influenced by run length. The 
diffusion-model analysis showed that boundary separation was higher in the all context than in 
the none context, and this difference was also not influenced by run length. Combined, the 
behavioral data and the diffusion-model fits suggest that subjects make proactive response-
strategy adjustments in the stop-signal paradigm, even when the stop-signal context changes on 
every trial. Thus, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that the discrepancy between our findings 
and those of Strayer and Kramer (1994) is not due to short run lengths in Strayer and Kramer’s 
experiments. 
Experiment 4 
 The results of Experiments 1-3 suggest that subjects balance the competing demands of 
stopping and going by trading speed in the go task for success in the stop task. In Experiment 4, 
we tested whether these response-strategy adjustments were influenced by the duration of the 
stop process. We compared a nonselective-stop condition (the all context) with a selective-stop 
condition, in which subjects had to stop their response when one tone occurred but not when 
another tone occurred. Riegler (1986) found longer SSRTs in selective stopping than in 
nonselective stopping, reflecting the greater demands on the stop process. To implement 
 23 
selective stopping we included two cues in addition to the standard ‘all’ and ‘none’ cues: ‘low,’  
which instructed subjects to inhibit responses when a low tone occurred but not when a high tone 
occurred, and ‘high,’ which instructed subjects to inhibit responses when a high tone occurred 
but not when a low tone occurred. We expected longer SSRT following ‘high’ and ‘low’ than 
following ‘all’. If proactive response-strategy adjustments are influenced by the duration of the 
stop process, then we should observe longer RTs in the low/high context than in the all context 
because SSRT should be longer in the low/high context than in the all context. By contrast, if 
proactive response-strategy adjustments are influenced by the outcome of the stop process, then 
we should observe similar RTs in the low/high and all contexts because the procedure that 
tracked SSD should produce similar values of p(respond|signal) in the two contexts.  
Method 
 Subjects. Eighteen students from Vanderbilt University participated for course credit. All 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and all were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment.  
 Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. These were the same as in Experiment 1 except for 
the following: Half of the trials were low/high context trials, 1/4 were none context trials and 1/4 
were all context trials. We used these proportions to ensure that at the end of the experiment, we 
had an equal number of relevant signals in the low/high context and the all context.  
 In the low/high context, the SSD for relevant stop signals was initially set at 150 ms and 
continuously adjusted according to same tracking procedure as in the all context. SSD for 
irrelevant stop signals was the same as the current SSD for relevant stop signals in the low/high 
context; note that SSD was not adjusted after irrelevant stop signals.  
Results and Discussion 
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We used the same exclusion criteria as in Experiment 1. Mean RT for included trials was 
calculated after exclusions of outliers (2.2%).  
Signal analyses. For all three contexts, we compared performance on no-stop-signal trials 
and stop-signal trials first. RT, accuracy and omission rate are presented in Table 2; the ANOVA 
summary tables are presented in Table 3.  
RT was longer for stop-signal trials (415 ms) than for no-stop-signal trials (381 ms) in the 
none context; the differences in omission rate and accuracy were not significant. Consistent with 
the previous experiments and the horse-race model, we found that signal-respond RTs (433 ms) 
were shorter than no-stop-signal RTs (453 ms) in the all context, although this difference was not 
significant. Accuracy was comparable for no-stop-signal and signal-respond trials. In the 
low/high context, RTs were longer for invalid stop-signal trials (599 ms) than for no-stop-signal 
trials (437 ms) and signal-respond trials (401 ms). These findings replicate previous studies (e.g., 
De Jong, Coles & Logan, 1995), and suggest that making a decision about the validity of the stop 
signal interfered with responding to the go task. Omission rate was also higher for invalid-stop-
signal trials (6.4%) than for no-stop-signal trials (0.6%), suggesting that subjects incorrectly 
stopped the response on a proportion of the invalid-stop-signal trials. Go accuracy was 
comparable for the different trial types in the low/high context.  
 We also compared stopping performance in relevant stop-signal trials in the low/high 
context and the all context. P(respond|signal), SSD and SSRT are presented in Table 1. Mean 
p(respond|signal) was comparable in both contexts (p > .13). In line with Riegler (1986), we 
found that SSRT was longer in the low/high context (259 ms) than in the all context (229 ms), 
although this difference just failed to reach significance, F(1,17) = 4.2, MSE = 1,799, p = .06, ηp2 
= .20.  
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Context analyses. To determine whether proactive response-strategy adjustments are 
affected by the demands of the stop task, we analyzed no-stop-signal RTs by means of a repeated 
measures ANOVA with context as a within-subjects factor. Summary tables for the ANOVAs 
are presented in Table 4. Planned comparisons were performed using the error term of the global 
analysis. Mean RTs and accuracy scores are depicted Figure 6A; standard deviations appear in 
Table 2. Because there were not enough observations for all positions in the none and all context, 
we did not test the interaction between context and position in a run. 
 Consistent with the proactive-adjustment hypothesis, there was a main effect of context 
for both RT data and accuracy data. Planned comparisons demonstrated that RTs were longer in 
the all (453 ms) and low/high context (437 ms) than in the none context (381 ms). The difference 
between RTs in the low/high and the all context was not significant. Planned comparisons 
demonstrated that accuracy was higher in the all (98.3%) and low/high context (97.8%) than in 
the none context (96.3%). Accuracy was comparable in the ‘low/high’ and all context. Combined, 
these findings suggest that the response threshold was increased when subjects expected relevant 
stop signals to occur, but these proactive adjustments were not influenced by the difficulty of the 
stop task.  
Diffusion-model fits. Diffusion parameters were estimated for each subject and each 
context condition. Because of the lower number of trials in the all and none contexts (about 60 
trials per context per subject), we allowed variability in starting point, non-decision time and 
growth rate to differ between the conditions. This let us use data from all subjects; without 
allowing variability to differ between the conditions, model fits were poor for certain subjects 
(i.e., the predicted distribution differed significantly from the observed distribution). Effects of 
context on boundary separation, growth rate and non-decision time were analyzed by means of 
 26 
separate repeated measures ANOVAs with context as within-subjects factor. The mean values 
for each parameter appear in Table 5 and the estimated decision time and non-decision time are 
depicted in Figure 6B; analyses appear in Table 6.  
Replicating the results of Experiment 1, we found that boundary separation was 
influenced by the context. Planned comparisons showed that boundary separation was higher in 
the all (1.10) and low/high (1.16) context than in the none context (1.00). The difference between 
the all and low/high context was not significant. These findings are consistent with the 
behavioral results and suggest that subjects made similar response-strategy adjustments in the 
low/high and all context. Thus, proactive response-strategy adjustments seem to depend more on 
the outcome than on the duration of the stop process. Non-decision time was also influenced by 
stop-signal context. Planned comparisons showed that non-decision time was longer in the all 
(318 ms) and low/high context (301 ms) than in the none context (274 ms). The difference 
between the all and low/high context failed to reach significance. Growth rate was not influenced 
by stop-signal context.  
Summary. In Experiment 4, we asked whether the duration of the stop process influenced 
proactive response-strategy adjustments. Replicating previous studies, we found that SSRT was 
longer in the low/high context than in the all context. However, RTs, accuracy and boundary 
separation were comparable in the low/high context and the all context. These findings suggest 
that proactive response-strategy adjustments depend more on the outcome of the stop process 
[i.e., p(respond|signal)] than on the duration of the stop process (i.e., SSRT).  
Experiment 5 
In Experiment 5, we examined whether proactive response-strategy adjustments are 
influenced by the proportion of stop signals. Logan (1981; Logan & Burkell, 1986) found that 
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RTs increased when the proportion of stop signals increased. To determine whether these 
differences could be produced proactively on a trial-by-trial basis, we used three context cues: 
0%, 30% and 70%, each indicating the probability that a stop signal would be presented on the 
next trial. Unlike the none context of the other experiments, no stop signals were presented in the 
0% context. 
Method 
Subjects. Eighteen students from Vanderbilt University participated for course credit. All 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and all were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment.  
 Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The go task was the same as in Experiment 1. We 
used three context cues, each indicating the probability that a stop signal would be presented: 0% 
(11 x 6 mm), 30% (16 x 6 mm) or 70% (16 x 6 mm). Thus, stop signals were presented only in 
the 30% and 70% contexts. Trials were divided in runs of 4 or 6 trials in the same context. Run 
length was randomized with the same restrictions used in Experiment 1. 1/3 of the trials were 0% 
context trials, 1/3 of the trials were 30% context trials and 1/3 of the trials were 70% context 
trials. The experiment started with a short practice block of 24 trials, followed by 14 
experimental blocks of 60 trials.  
Results and Discussion.  
The exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. Mean RT for included trials was 
calculated after removal of outlying RTs (3.2%).  
Signal analyses. P(respond|signal), mean SSD and mean SSRT are presented in Table 1. 
As can be seen, p(respond|signal) was comparable for the 30% context and the 70% context (F < 
1). We found that SSRT was similar in the 30% (226 ms) and 70% context (213 ms, F < 1). This 
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finding suggests that stopping performance was not influenced by stop-signal probability (Logan 
& Burkell, 1986) or by proactive response-strategy adjustments (see below).  
RT, accuracy and omission rates are presented in Table 2. In the 30% and 70% context, 
signal-respond RTs (424 ms and 513 ms, respectively) were shorter than no-stop-signal RTs (489 
ms and 574 ms, respectively). In both contexts, accuracy was comparable for signal trials and no-
stop-signal trials  
Context analyses. To examine whether stop-signal probability influenced proactive 
response-strategy adjustments, we analyzed no-stop-signal performance by means of a repeated 
measures ANOVA with context (0%, 30% or 70%) as a within-subjects factor. Summary tables 
for the ANOVAs are presented in Table 4. Observed RTs and accuracy scores are depicted 
Figure 6A; standard deviations appear in Table 2. For the 0% and 30% contexts, we tested the 
interaction between context and position; these analyses appear in Appendix C. 
Overall, we found a main effect of context for no-stop-signal RT, accuracy, and omission 
rate. Planned comparisons showed that no-stop-signal RT was longer in the 30% context (489 ms) 
and 70% contexts (574 ms) than in the 0% context (395 ms) and longer in the 70% context than 
in the 30% context. Planned comparisons showed that accuracy was higher in the 30% context 
(97.8%) and 70% contexts (98.4%) than in the 0% context (96.1%) but the difference between 
the 30% and the 70% contexts was not significant. Combined, the RT and accuracy data suggest 
that subjects made proactive response-strategy adjustments when relevant stop signals could 
occur. The RT difference between the 30% and 70% contexts suggests that subjects made greater 
adjustments when stop-signal probability was high. 
Diffusion-model fits. Diffusion parameters were estimated for each subject and each 
context condition. As in Experiment 4, we allowed variability in starting point, non-decision time 
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and growth rate to differ between the conditions. Effects of context on boundary separation, 
growth rate, and non-decision time were analyzed by means of separate repeated measures 
ANOVAs with context as within-subjects factor. The mean values for each parameter appear in 
Table 5 and the estimated decision time and non-decision time are depicted in Figure 6B; 
analyses appear in Table 6.  
Replicating the previous experiments, we found that boundary separation was influenced 
by the stop-signal context: planned comparisons showed that boundary separation was greater in 
the 30% context (1.33) than in the 0% context (1.05). Planned comparisons found no significant 
difference in non-decision time between the 0% context (287 ms) and the 30% context (296 ms). 
This small numerical difference could be due to dual-task requirements. Note that we did 
observe significant and large non-decision differences in Experiments 1 and 3-4, which may 
have been influenced by response-strategy adjustments. We will discuss this issue further in the 
General Discussion. Consistent with Experiment 1 (but inconsistent with Experiments 3 and 4), 
we found a significantly higher growth rate in the 0% context (4.14 units/sec) than in the 30% 
context (3.6 units/sec). There were also differences between the 70% context and the 0% and 
30% contexts (see Tables 5 and 6). However, the results for the 70% context should be 
interpreted with caution because of the very low number of trials (about21 trials per subject), 
which may not be enough to get reliable parameter estimates (Voss & Voss, 2007)3.  
Summary. We found that RTs were longer and accuracy was higher in the 30% and 70% 
contexts than in the 0% context, suggesting proactive response-strategy adjustments. 
Furthermore, we found that RTs were longer in the 70% context than in the 30% context, 
suggesting that subjects made greater adjustments when the stop-signal probability was higher. 
This finding is consistent with previously observed differences between blocks with low and 
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high proportions of stop signals (Logan, 1981; Logan & Burkell, 1986), and suggests that 
proactive response-strategy adjustments within a block are similar to proactive response-strategy 
adjustments at the beginning of a block.  
General Discussion 
In the present study, we examined whether subjects can proactively change response 
strategies in the stop-signal paradigm by presenting pre-cues that informed subjects about the 
occurrence of stop signals on the next few trials. We tested two hypotheses: the proactive- 
adjustment hypothesis and the dual-task requirements hypotheses. Over all experiments, the 
results were consistent with both hypotheses: in the stop-signal experiments (Experiments 1, 3-5), 
RT and go accuracy were higher in stop-signal contexts than in no-stop-signal contexts, 
suggesting that subjects increased the response threshold in the stop-signal contexts, even when 
the context changed after every trial (Experiment 3). This conclusion was supported by the 
diffusion-model fits, which showed that response threshold was higher in stop-signal contexts 
than in no-stop-signal contexts. These effects are consistent with the proactive-adjustment 
hypothesis. However, Experiment 2 showed that RTs but not accuracy was influenced by dual-
task requirements, and the diffusion-model fits showed that non-decision time but not response 
threshold was influenced by dual-task requirements. This non-decision time effect in the dual-
task experiment suggests that the non-decision time effects in the stop-signal experiments may 
be (partly) due to dual-task requirements. Growth-rate differences were inconsistent across the 
experiments. Growth rate was higher in the dual-task condition than in the single-task condition 
of Experiment 2, which is paradoxical. It was lower in the stop-signal context than in the no-
stop-signal context in Experiments 1 and 5, but it did not differ significantly in Experiments 3 
and 4. Therefore, the behavioral data and the diffusion-model fits suggest that dual-task 
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requirements mainly influenced non-decision processes, increasing RTs in stop-signal and dual-
task contexts.  
In the remainder of the article, we further discuss the proactive response-strategy 
adjustment and dual-task requirements hypotheses and we consider two alternative hypotheses: 
the delayed-processing hypothesis and the response-suppression hypothesis. We conclude with 
some practical guidelines for stop-signal paradigm users.  
The role of proactive response-strategy adjustment in cognitive control  
The findings of the present study demonstrate that subjects can make proactive response-
strategy adjustments on a trial-by-trial basis, suggesting a flexible cognitive control system that 
can adjust itself to achieve a balance between competing goals. Response-strategy adjustments 
are typically investigated in choice RT tasks in which subjects balance speed and accuracy. We 
think that there may be important parallels between adjustments in choice RT tasks and 
adjustments in the stop-signal task. Several choice RT studies showed that subjects trade speed 
for accuracy after errors or after conflict is detected (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Burns, 1971; 
Holroyd, Yeung, Coles & Cohen, 2005; Rabbitt, 1966); similarly, stop-signal studies showed 
that subjects trade speed in the go task for success in the stop task after stop-signal trials (e.g., 
Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Verbruggen & Logan, in press; Verbruggen et al., 2008). Several 
studies demonstrated that subjects trade speed for accuracy in choice RT tasks when instructions 
vary between blocks (e.g., Howell & Kreidler, 1963; Pachella, 1974; Rinkenauer et al., 2004); 
similarly, subjects trade speed in the go task for success in stopping in stop-signal blocks (e.g., 
Logan, 1981; Stuphorn & Schall, 2006; Verbruggen et al., 2004). Combined, these studies show 
that subjects can make proactive response-strategy adjustments at the beginning of a block and 
then make trial-by-trial reactive adjustments during the block. Whether subjects can also make 
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proactive response-strategy adjustments on a trial-by-trial basis in choice RT tasks is still 
debated. Several studies showed that subjects did not adjust response strategies proactively when 
pre-cues informed them about upcoming item types (Brown & Steyvers, 2005; Los, 1999; 
Strayer & Kramer, 1994). Other studies observed proactive response-strategy adjustments but 
only when the pre-cues explicitly instruct subjects to respond as quickly as possible (Gopher, 
Armony & Greenshpan, 2000; Kleinsorge, 2001; Los, 1999) or when the use of item-informative 
pre-cues was strongly emphasized (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1982; for similar ideas about the use of 
pre-cues, see Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck & Demanet, 2007). In the present study, 
pre-cues informed subjects about the occurrence of stop signals on the next few trials. Therefore, 
one of the major contributions of the present study is to show that subjects are capable of 
adjusting decision criteria proactively on a trial-by-trial basis, even without the explicit 
instruction to adjust response strategies.  
The similarities between these response-strategy adjustments in choice RT and stopping 
suggest subjects make the same adjustments in the different paradigms. One way of interpreting 
the similarities is that subjects manipulate the speed-accuracy tradeoff in both paradigms. Indeed, 
trading speed for accuracy in the go task increases success rate in the stop task (Logan, 1981). 
The results of the present study are consistent with this idea: when subjects expect stop signals to 
occur, both RTs and go accuracy increase. The diffusion model (e.g., Ratcliff, 2006; Ratcliff et 
al., 1999; Usher & McClelland, 2001) provides new insight into this tradeoff: response-strategy 
adjustments are implemented by manipulating response threshold (boundary separation). We 
assume that the similarities exist not because subjects intentionally trade speed for accuracy in 
the two paradigms, but because they intentionally adjust response threshold to control speed, and 
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changes in go accuracy in the stop-signal paradigm are an unintended consequence of this 
adjustment.  
More generally, we assume that response-threshold adjustments in choice RT and stop-
signal tasks are an integral part of cognitive control (Logan, 1985). Many theorists argue that 
executive processes exert control by manipulating the goal representations in response to 
changes in internal states or changes in the environment (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan & 
Gordon, 2001; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Miller & Cohen, 2001). We elaborate this idea by 
suggesting that executive processes also adjust response strategies to achieve a balance between 
opposing goals in response to conflicting or ambiguous instructions (see also e.g., Howell & 
Kreidler, 1963; Logan, 1985; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1982).  
Dual-task costs in the stop-signal paradigm  
 The results of the present study showed that the increased RTs in stop-signal contexts are 
due to dual-task requirements as well as proactive response-strategy adjustments. The dual-task 
cost seems inconsistent with previous studies that showed that stopping is hardly influenced by 
go processing (Logan & Burkell, 1986; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan et al., 1984; Verbruggen, 
Schneider et al., in press). For example, Logan and Cowan (1984) demonstrated that SSRT did 
not show the typical dual-task interference effect (or psychological-refractory-period effect), 
which is commonly observed when subjects have to execute two responses in rapid succession 
(see Pashler, 1994). However, the absence of a psychological-refractory period effect on SSRT 
does not preclude the presence of dual-task concurrence costs in the go task. Indeed, Logan, 
Cowan and Davis (1984) found no refractory-period effect but they found a general slowing in 
stopping performance in a choice RT task compared to a simple RT task and suggested that the 
SSRT difference was due to resource competition between stop processes and go processes. 
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Similarly, Logan and Burkell (1986) suggested that there is a concurrence cost in advance task 
preparation when subjects are preparing to respond to different stimuli. These ideas are 
consistent with the results of the present study and are in line with dual-task requirement 
hypothesis, which assumes a general (but relatively small) concurrence cost in the stop-signal 
paradigm. 
The delayed-responding hypothesis and the response-suppression hypothesis. 
The results of Experiment 2 suggested that dual-task requirements influenced non-
decision time. However, as can be seen in Table 5 and in Figures 4-6, the non-decision time 
differences in Experiments 1 and 3-4 (see also the 70% context of Experiment 5) were generally 
larger than the non-decision time difference in Experiment 2. Because there are no a priori 
reasons to assume that dual-task requirements should influence non-decision time processes 
differently in stop-signal and dual-task contexts, the diffusion-model fits suggest that the non-
decision time differences in the stop-signal experiments were not solely due to dual-task 
requirements. We consider two hypotheses that might account for the larger non-decision time 
differences in the stop-signal experiments: the delayed-processing hypothesis and the response-
suppression hypothesis.  
 The delayed-processing hypothesis assumes that subjects postpone processing of the go 
stimulus, the execution of the go response, or both, until they know they can safely execute the 
response. This would affect the non-decision time parameter in the diffusion model fits. 
However, delayed processing is implausible for several reasons. First, SSD changes after every 
stop-signal trial, making it difficult to estimate the next SSD accurately. Second, subjects also 
need to estimate SSRT to determine whether they have enough time to inhibit the response at a 
given SSD. Estimating SSRT may be difficult because there is no overt response to the stop 
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signal. Third, time estimation is an effortful process, and previous studies showed strong dual-
task interference effects when subjects estimated time intervals while performing a concurrent 
task (see e.g., Brown, 2006; Vandierendonck, De Vooght & Van der Goten, 1998a). Dual-task 
interference would make time estimation in the stop-signal paradigm even more difficult than it 
already is. Therefore, we conclude that the delayed-responding hypothesis is implausible.  
The response-suppression hypothesis assumes that opposing task goals suppress motor 
output and this effect is particularly strong in the stop-signal paradigm. Frank (2006) proposed a 
computational model of the basal ganglia circuitry and suggested that temporary suppression of 
the motor system slows down responding in cognitively demanding situations: fast responses are 
prevented through activation of the subthalamic nucleus, which excites the internal segment of 
the globus pallidus, making the thalamus more inhibited. This suppression would appear in non-
decision time in diffusion-model fits. Based on Frank’s model, the response-suppression 
hypothesis assumes that subjects may temporarily suppress all motor output when they expect 
stop signals on the next trial(s) (see also e.g., Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank & Poldrack, 2007; 
Stuphorn & Schall, 2006; van den Wildenberg, van der Molen & Logan, 2002). This does not 
imply that subjects will not increase the response threshold in stop-signal blocks; these control 
adjustments are not mutually exclusive so subjects may do both (see also, Rinkenauer et al., 2004, 
who showed that speed-accuracy instructions influenced both decisional and non-decisional 
processes).  
A final remark concerns the growth-rate differences between the none and all contexts in 
Experiments 1 and 5. Experiment 2 showed that growth rate does not decrease in dual-task 
contexts. This suggests that lower growth rates in the stop-signal contexts of Experiments 1 and 
5 were not due to dual-task requirements. It is unclear how response strategies could influence 
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growth rate of information. One possibility is that all ongoing processing (including 
accumulation of information) is suppressed in stop-signal contexts. To our knowledge, strategic 
effects on growth rate have not been studied systematically so further research is needed here.  
Practical guidelines 
The results of the present study suggest that subjects change response thresholds and 
suppress motor output when they expect stop signals to occur. This finding has some practical 
implications for researchers using the stop-signal paradigm. Researchers usually tell subjects not 
to wait for a stop signal, but subjects slow their RTs nevertheless. We showed that the slowing is 
greater when the proportion of stop signals increases. Therefore, it is advisable to keep the 
proportion of stop signals as low as possible. 
Because of response-strategy adjustments, it is also advisable to use the tracking 
procedure to adjust SSD. The tracking procedure adjusts SSD to account for differences in RT 
differences, keeping p(respond|signal) close to .50, which produces in the most reliable SSRT 
estimates (Band, van der Molen & Logan, 2003). By contrast, the fixed-SSD procedure does not 
account for differences in RT, so p(respond|signal) may be influenced by proactive response-
strategy adjustments (see Figure 2A vs. Figure 2D) and produce less reliable SSRT estimates 
(see Figure 2D). Therefore, we advise researchers to use the tracking procedure in combination 
with a low proportion of stop-signal trials.  
When comparing stopping performance between groups, researchers sometimes compare 
RTs to determine whether the observed SSRT differences are due to differences in inhibitory 
processes or to general processes that influence both executing and stopping a response (see e.g., 
Ridderinkhof et al., 1999). Our results suggest that subjects typically make response-strategy 
adjustments when they expect stop signals to occur, so increased RTs may reflect adjusted 
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control settings instead of impaired performance on the go task. Therefore, we advise researchers 
to include a no-stop-signal control block when they want to examine both go-task and stop-task 
differences (see e.g., Verbruggen et al., 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2004).  
Conclusions 
In the present study, we demonstrated that subjects can adjust response strategies 
proactively to achieve a balance between competing task goals on a trial-by-trial basis. We found 
longer RT and higher accuracy when pre-cues indicated that stop signals were likely, which we 
attributed primarily to response-strategy adjustments. Dual-task requirements played a smaller 
role. Diffusion-model fits showed that these response-strategy adjustments involved increasing 
the response threshold, and possibly, suppressing the motor output, which is consistent with the 
idea that control adjustments can influence both decisional and non-decisional stages (see e.g., 
Frank, 2006; Rinkenauer et al., 2004). An important goal for future research is to explicate the 
relations between these proactive response-strategy adjustments and reactive response strategy 
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Footnotes 
                                                
1  Results of Emeric et al. (2007) suggest that stop-signal presentation on trial n-2 did not 
influence no-stop-signal performance on trial n (but see Verbruggen & Logan, in press, for long-
term aftereffects of stopping when large stimulus sets are used). Consistent with Emeric et al’s 
finding, we found similar results when we included all trials that followed a no-stop-signal trial 
(i.e., trial n-1 was a no-stop-signal trial) and when we included only trials that followed at least 
two no-stop-signal trials (i.e., trial n-1 AND trial n-2 were no-stop-signal trials), suggesting that 
there was no effect of stop-signal presentation on trial n-2. Given this finding, we included all 
trials that immediately followed a no-stop-signal trial to maximize the number of observations. 
2  No-stop-signal trials following a correct no-stop-signal trials were coded as correct or 
incorrect. For the model fits, starting point (z) was set to 0.5 (when responses are coded as 
correct or incorrect, it is implausible that z deviates from a/2; therefore, z—which is refers to a 
fraction of the boundary separation —was fixed at 0.5). Boundary separation (a), growth rate (v) 
and non-decision time (t0) were allowed to take different values in the different stop-signal 
contexts. 
3  For all parameters, we found similar differences between the 0% context and the 30% 
context when we excluded 70% context trials from the diffusion-model fits.  
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Appendix A: Position analyses Experiment 1 
To further test the response-strategy adjustment hypothesis, we examined the effect of 
trial position following the context cues in Experiment 1. Each cue was presented for 4 or 8 trials 
(see Figure 3). If response-strategy adjustments are made over the course of the first couple of 
trials, then RT and accuracy in the all context should increase over the first couple of trials 
whereas RT and accuracy in the none context should decrease over the first couple of trials (this 
interaction is depicted in the top panels of Figure A1; for a similar idea, see e.g., Brown & 
Steyvers, 2005). By contrast, if subjects immediately make proactive response-strategy 
adjustments when the context cue is presented at the start of a run, then there should be no such 
interaction and the RT and accuracy differences between the none and all context should be the 
same for all positions. 
We excluded trials that followed a stop-signal trial or an incorrect no-stop-signal trial 
(including no-stop-signal trials on which no response was executed) in analyses of go 
performance. Mean RTs were calculated after removal of go errors. We collapsed across position 
5-8 to have sufficient observations in all cells of the data matrix. RTs and accuracy data were 
analyzed by means of a 2 (context: ‘all’ vs. ‘none’) by 5 (position: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-8) repeated 
measures ANOVA. We will only focus on the interaction between context and position here. 
RTs and accuracy scores are depicted in Figure A1. 
For RTs, we found a significant interaction between position and context, F(4,68) = 8.0, 
MSE = 797, p < .001, ηp 2 = .32, suggesting that the difference between the all and none contexts 
was larger at the end of a run than at the beginning of a run (see Figure A1). Note that RTs were 
longer on the first trial of a run than on trials 2-8 of a run in the none and all contexts (see Figure 
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A1), suggesting a residual context cue-encoding effect (see e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 2003). For 
the accuracy data, we found an interaction between position and context, F(4,68) = 2.6, MSE = 8, 
p < .05, ηp 2 = .13. As can be seen in Figure A1, accuracy decreased in the none context over the 
run of trials whereas accuracy was similar for all positions in the all context. Combined, the RTs 
and the accuracy data suggest that in the all context, subjects made proactive response-strategy 
adjustments at the beginning of the context (i.e., before the first trial) by increasing the response 
threshold. By contrast, the accuracy data suggest that in the none context, the response threshold 
is lowered during a run of trials. In other words, the position analyses suggest that subjects 
increase the response threshold at the beginning of the all context,  whereas they lower the 




Appendix B: Position analyses Experiment 3 
For run length 2 and run length 4, we also analyzed the effect of position. We excluded 
trials that followed a stop-signal trial or an incorrect no-stop-signal trial (including no-stop-signal 
trials on which no response was executed) in analyses of go performance. Mean RTs were 
calculated after removal of go errors. RTs and accuracy data were analyzed by means of a 
separate repeated measures ANOVA with context and position as within-subjects factors. We 
will only focus on the interaction between context and position here. RTs and accuracy scores 
are depicted in Figure B1. For run length 2, the interaction between context and positions were 
non-significant for RTs and accuracy, both F’s < 1.7. For run length 4, we found a significant 
interaction for RTs, F(4,68) = 10.3, MSE = 1,360, p < .001, ηp 2 = .38. For accuracy, the 
interaction was not significant, F < 1. Combined, the RT data and accuracy data once more 
suggest that subject made proactive response-strategy adjustments at the beginning of the all 
context.  
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Appendix C: Position analyses Experiment 5 
We excluded trials that followed a stop-signal trial or an incorrect no-stop-signal trial 
(including no-stop-signal trials on which no response was executed) in analyses of go 
performance. Mean RTs were calculated after removal of go errors. RTs and accuracy data were 
analyzed by means of a separate repeated measures ANOVA with context and position as within-
subjects factors. We will only focus on the interaction between context and position here. RTs 
and accuracy scores are depicted in Figure C1.  
For RTs, we found a significant interaction between position and context, F(4,68) = 5.5, 
MSE = 635, p < .01, ηp 2 = .24, suggesting that the difference between the 0% and 30% contexts 
was larger at the end of a run than at the beginning of a run (see Figure C1). We did not find 
such interaction for the accuracy data, F(4,68) = 1.8, MSE = 5.4, p > .13, ηp 2 = .10, suggesting 
that the proactive adjustments were made at the beginning of a run. 
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Table 1: Relevant stop-signal data for Experiments 1-5.  
 P(resp|signal) SSD (in ms) SSRT (in ms) 
Experiment 1 .47 (.01) 247 (26) 263 (17) 
Experiment 3 – run length 1 .49 (.01) 353 (46) 223 (19) 
Experiment 3 – run length 2  .49 (.01) 351 (58) 233 (17) 
Experiment 3 – run length 4  .51 (.02) 298 (41) 255 (11) 
Experiment 4 – low/high .49 (.02) 181 (24) 259 (14) 
Experiment 4 – all .47 (.02) 205 (22) 229 (10) 
Experiment 5 – 30% .49 (.01) 269 (17) 226 (10) 
Experiment 5 – 70% .49 (.01) 408 (28) 213 (13) 
 
Note: We used the integration method to calculate SSRT (Logan & Cowan, 1984). The no-stop-
signal RTs are rank-ordered, and the nth RT is selected, where n is obtained by multiplying the 
number of RTs in the distribution by the probability of responding at a given delay. To estimate 
SSRT, SSD is subtracted from the nth RT. This process is repeated for each stop signal delay for 
each subject. The results are then averaged across stop signal delays. However, when using the 
tracking procedure, some SSDs will more often than other SSDs. In order to obtain reliable 
SSRT estimations, we selected for each subject the two SSDs that occurred most frequently and 
we calculated SSRT for both SSDs separately. In a final step, we took for each subject the 
average of both SSRTs.  
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Table 2: RT (ms), accuracy (%) and omission rate (%) for the different stop-signal contexts in 
Experiments 1-5 (SDs between parentheses). In Experiment 2, the single  
context corresponds to the none context; the dual context corresponds to the all context. In 
Experiment 5, the 0% context corresponds to the none context. 
 
 none: RT  none: accuracy  none: omission rate  
 no-SS SS no-NS no-SS no-SS SS 
EXP1 408 (54) 425 (61) 97.2 (1.7) 97.1 (1.9) 0.9 (1.2) 2.4 (2.6) 
EXP2 390 (47) 397 (62) 96.0 (2.6) 96.5 (3.4) 0.0 (0.0) 0.9 (2.9) 
EXP3-R1 465 (87) 494 (95) 97.1 (2.4) 97.2 (3.7) 1.1 (3.9) 2.6 (3.9) 
EXP3-R2 456 (90) 488 (113) 96.3 (2.5) 96.4 (3.6) 1.3 (1.9) 2.8 (4.0) 
EXP3-R4 436 (74) 454 (93) 96.4 (2.9) 96.8 (4.0) 0.7 (1.3) 2.1 (3.4) 
EXP4 381 (51) 415 (81) 96.3 (2.8) 98.2 (3.6) 0.3 (0.9) 1.4 (2.8) 
EXP5 (0%) 395 (35) - 96.1 (4.0) - 0.1 (0.2)  
 all: RT  all: accuracy  all: omission rate  
 no-SS SS no-SS SS no-SS SS 
EXP1A 501 (87) 444 (66) 98.7 (1.4) 98.1 (2.5) 0.9 (1.5) - 
EXP2 399 (45) 399 (56) 96.7 (2.2) 97.4 (3.4) 0.2 (0.4) 0.1 (0.8) 
EXP3-R1 577 (162) 507 (137) 98.0 (2.6) 99.3 (2.0) 1.6 (3.9) - 
EXP3-R2 571 (188) 517 (162) 97.7 (2.2) 98.5 (2.9) 2.7 (4.2) - 
EXP3-R4 548 (155) 487 (122) 97.4 (2.7) 94.9 (6.4) 2.6 (4.1) - 
EXP4 453 (95) 433 (64) 98.3 (2.1) 96.7(6.0) 0.7 (1.2) - 
EXP5 (30%) 489 (67) 424 (42) 97.8 (3.3) 98.3 (2.3) 0.4 (0.6) - 
EXP5 (70%) 574 (111) 513 (91) 98.4 (2.3) 98.9 (1.4) 1.5 (2.4) - 
 low/high: RT  low/high: accuracy  low/high: omission rate  



















(Continuation Table 2) 
Note: EXP = Experiment; no-SS = no-stop-signal trial, SS = stop-signal trial; in-SS = invalid-
stop-signal trial; R1 = run length 1, R2 = run length 2; R4 = run length 4 
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Table 3: Summary tables for ANOVAs performed to compare go performance on no-stop-signal 
and signal trials.  
 
 RT accuracy omitted responses 
 F MSE ηp 2 F MSE ηp 2 F MSE ηp 2 
EXP 1          
 none (1,17) 5.2* 519 .24 0.0 3.0 .00 5.7* 3.5 .25 
 all (1,17) 33.3** 859 .66 1.3 2.4 .07 - - - 
EXP 2           
 single (1,17) 1.5 377 .08 0.5 4.6 .03 - - - 
 dual (1,17) 0.0 335 .00 1.3 2.7 .07 0.7 0.1 .04 
EXP 3           
 none (1,17) 14.7** 1,297 .46 0.2 5.0 .01 13.5** 4.3 .44 
 all (1,17) 32.0** 3,188 .65 0.0 10.0 .00 - - - 
EXP 4           
 none (1,17) 6.6* 1,503 .28 2.5 14.0 .13 2.4 4.5 .12 
 all (1,17) 1.4 2,637 .08 1.0 21.7 .06 - - - 
 l/h (2,34) 87.5** 2,280 .84 0.9 4.0 .05 21.7** 14.0 .56 
EXP 5          
 30% (1,17) 41.9** 911 .71 1.2 2.0 .07 - - - 
 70% (17,17) 46.4* 718 73 1.3 1.8 .07 - - - 
 
Note: **p < .01, *p < .05; l/h = ‘low/high’ context; 30% = ‘30%’ context, 70% = ‘70% context. 
For the analyses of omitted responses in the low/high context, we included only no-stop-signal 
trials and invalid-signal trials (df = 1,17). EXP = Experiment  
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Table 4: Summary tables of ANOVAs performed to test the main effect of context in 
Experiments 1-5.  
 RT  accuracy omitted responses 
 F MSE ηp 2 F MSE ηp 2 F MSE ηp 2 
EXP 1 (1, 17) 28.4** 2,728 .63 18.4** 1.1 .52 0.0 0.7 .00 
EXP 2 (1,17) 6.0* 119 .26 1.9 2.4 .10 - - - 
EXP 3 (1,17)          
 C (1,17) 21.2** 16273 .56 16.3** 2.0 .49 4.6* 8.6 .21 
 RL (2,34) 1.8 4,674 .10 1.2 4.1 .06 0.3 13.6 .02 
 C X RL (2,34) 0.0 3,030 .00 0.2 3.6 .01 1.6 2.7 .09 
EXP 4 (2,34) 14.3** 1,778 .46 6.4 3.2 .27 1.2 0.7 .07 
 PC: n-lh (1,34) 15.7** 1,778 .32 6.9* 3.2 .17 - - - 
PC: n-a (1,34) 26.6** 1,778 .44 11.8** 3.2 .17 - - - 
PC: lh-a (1,34) 1.3 1,778 .04 0.7 3.2 .02 - - - 
EXP 5 (2,34) 40.1** 3,581 .70 4.6* 5.2 .21 4.5* 2.2 .21 
 PC: 0-30 (1,34) 22.3** 3,581 .40 4.7* 5.2 .12 0.5 2.2 .02 
PC: 0-70 (1,34) 80.2** 3,581 .70 8.5** 5.2 .20 8.2** 2.2 .19 
PC: 30-70 (1,34) 18.0** 3,581 .34 0.6 5.2 .02 4.7* 2.2 .12 
 
Note: **p < .01, *p < .05. C = context, RL = run length; PC = planned comparison.  
n = none context, a = all context, l/h = low/high context. EXP = Experiment 
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Table 5: Estimated diffusion parameters for Experiments 1-5 (SD between parentheses) 
  a v t0 (ms) sz sv st(0) p 
EXP1        
 a.c. 1.30 (.24) 3.76 (.77)  327 (49) 
.37 (.12) .31 (.32) .15 (.05) .74 (.26) 
 n.c. 1.12 (.20) 4.45 (1.08) 295 (33) 
EXP2        
 d.c. 0.93 (.20) 5.03 (1.07) 309 (23) 
.27 (.07) .50 (.97) .14 (.05) .90 (.10) 
 s.c 0.93(.16) 4.59 (1.09) 295 (23) 
EXP3-R1        
 a.c. 1.27 (.31) 3.50 (1.04) 387 (109) 
.41 (.16) .22 (.18) .17 (.10) .87 (.14) 
 n.c. 1.18 (.27) 3.80 (.97) 312 (42) 
EXP3-R2        
 a.c. 1.23 (.31) 3.47 (1.21) 397 (142) 
.35 (.16) .32 (.20) .15 (.08) .82 (.22) 
 n.c. 1.12 (.26) 3.67 (1.02) 319 (40) 
EXP3-R4        
 a.c. 1.17 (.24) 3.50 (1.10) 385 (96) 
.34 (.11) .25 (.15) .16 (.06) .83 (.22) 
 n.c. 1.12 (.18) 3.74 (.68) 301 (50) 
EXP 4        
 a.c. 1.10 (.28) 4.34 (1.28) 318 (35) .30 (.12) .37 (.32) .11 (.06) 
.71 (.20)  n.c. 1.00 (.24) 4.37 (1.29) 274 (20) .28 (.10) .33 (.25) .12 (.06) 
 l/h.c. 1.16 (.28) 4.43 (1.06) 301 (33) .38 (.13) .18 (.19) .13 (.08) 
EXP 5        
 70% 1.15 (14) 2.98 (.62) 412 (110) .37 (.08) .37 (.21) .19 (.11) 
.70 (.24)  30% 1.33 (.21) 3.56 (.72) 296 (43) .43 (.18) .22 (.30) .17 (.08) 






(Continuation Table 5) 
 
Note: The diffusion model assumes that there is inter-trial variability in starting point (sz), 
growth rate (sv) and non-decision time (st0). We estimated these variability parameters but did 
not focus on them because our hypotheses do not make specific predictions about inter-trial 
variability.   
a = boundary separation, v = growth rate, t(0) = non-decision time, p = probability of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic used to optimize the fit (larger values indicate better fits). EXP = 
Experiment; R1 = run length 1, R2 = run length 2; R4 = run length 4; a.c. = all context, n.c. = 
none context, d.c. = dual context, s.c = single context, 0% = 0% context, 30% = 30% context, 
70% = 70% context; 
 59 
Table 6: Summary tables of ANOVAs for estimated diffusion parameters in Experiments 1-5.  
 
 a v t(0) 
 F ηp 2 F ηp 2 F ηp 2 
EXP1: context (1,17) 24.5** .59 6.3* .27 8.2 .33 
EXP2: context (1,17) 0.0 .00 16.5** .24 54.2** .51 
EXP1 vs. EXP2       
 context (C; 1,34) 15.9** .32 0.5 .01 15.7** .32 
 experiment (EXP; 1,34)  19.0** .36 5.8* .15 1.0 .03 
 C x EXP (1,34) 15.9** .32 11.4** .25 2.3 .14 
EXP3       
 context (C; 1,17) 17.2** .50 2.1 .11 15.8** .48 
 run length (RL; 2,34) 2.0 .11 0.2 .01 0.8 .04 
 C x RL (2,34) 1.0 .06 0.1 .01 0.1 .00 
EXP4: context (2,34) 11.0** 39 0.4 .00 13.2** .44 
 PC: none vs. all (1,34) 8.1** .19 - - 26.2** .43 
 PC: none vs. low/high (1,34) 21.7** .51 - - 9.6** .22 
 PC: all vs. low/high (1,34) 3.2 .08 - - 4.0†† .11 
EXP5: context (2,34) 21.5** .56 16.9** .50 22.8** .57 
 PC: 0% vs. 30% (1,34) 41.7** .55 8.4** .20 0.2 .00 
 PC: 0% vs. 70% (1,34) 5.1* .13 33.9** .50 36.4** .52 
 PC: 30% vs. 70% (1,34) 17.6** .34 8.6** .20 31.8** .49 
 
**p < .01, *p < .05, ††p = .05, †p = .06,  
 
Note: When the main effect was significant, we performed planned comparisons (PC) using the 





Figure 1: Illustration of the probabilities of responding [p(respond|signal)] based on the horse-
race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984), given the distribution of no-stop-signal reaction times (no-
stop-signal RT), the stop-signal delay (SSD) and the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT). 
P(respond|signal) is represented by the area under the curve to the left of each dashed line 
 
Figure 2: A: RTs (X-axis) and accuracy scores (Y-axis) predicted by the proactive-adjustment 
hypothesis and the two versions of the dual-task requirements hypothesis [version 1: only non-
decision time(t0) is influenced; version 2: non-decision time and growth rate (v) are influenced].  
B: diffusion parameters (threshold, growth and non-decision time) for the stop-signal contexts 
(none or all) predicted by the proactive-adjustment hypothesis and the two versions of the dual-
task requirements hypothesis. Growth rate corresponds to the slopes of the lines. Non-decision 
time = stimulus processing + response execution. For purposes of clarity, we depicted total non-
decision time as the time before the information starts to accumulate.  
 
Figure 3: The sequence of events (from left to right). The numbers on the right indicate the 
position within a run of trials. The numbers on the left indicate the cue-presentation durations 





Figure 4A: Observed RT (X-axis) and accuracy (Y-axis) for each context for Experiments 1 and 
2.  
B: Estimated decision and non-decision time for each context for Experiments 1 and 2. Growth 
rate = accumulated evidence per second and response threshold (dotted lines) = boundary 
separation / 2. Decision time = response threshold / growth rate. Non-decision time = stimulus 
processing + response execution. For purposes of clarity, we depicted total non-decision time as 
the time before the information starts to accumulate.  
 
Figure 5A: Observed RT (X-axis) and accuracy (Y-axis) for each context and for each run length 
condition in Experiments 3.  
B: Estimated decision and non-decision time for each context and for each run length condition 
in Experiments 3. Growth rate = accumulated evidence per second and response threshold 
(dotted lines) = boundary separation / 2. Decision time = response threshold / growth rate. Non-
decision time = stimulus processing + response execution. For purposes of clarity, we depicted 
total non-decision time as the time before the information starts to accumulate.  
 
Figure 6A: Observed RT (X-axis) and accuracy (Y-axis) for each context for Experiments 4 and 
5. Note: l/h = low/high context. 
B: Estimated decision and non-decision time for each context for Experiments 4 and 5. Note: l/h 
= low/high context. Growth rate = accumulated evidence per second and response threshold 
(dotted lines) = boundary separation / 2. Decision time = response threshold / growth rate. Non-
decision time = stimulus processing + response execution. For purposes of clarity, we depicted 
total non-decision time as the time before the information starts to accumulate.  
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Figure Captions Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Top and middle panels: Predicted mean RT (left panel) and accuracy (right panel) for 
each context as a function of the trial position. When subjects make proactive response-strategy 
adjustments at the beginning of a run of trials, RT and accuracy should not be influenced by trial 
position; when response-strategy adjustments are made throughout a run of trials, RT and 
accuracy should be influenced by trial position. 
Bottom panels: Observed mean RT (left panel) and accuracy (right panel) for each context as a 
function of the trial position in Experiment 1. 
 
Figure B1: Mean RT (left panel) and accuracy (right panel) for each context and run-length 
condition (RL2 = run length 2 or RL4 = run length 4) as a function of the trial position in 
Experiment 3. 
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